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Abstract  
Objectives: Widespread organizational change is indispensable for significantly 
improved patient safety. This paper discusses critical issues in effective change 
management, drawing attention to the unintended consequences of pursuing 
patient safety without effective change management. It includes pointers from 
organizational change literature on critical issues in managing change, such as 
how change is defined, what the roles are of different participants, and how 
change is implemented and made self-sustaining. We make some preliminary 
observations about mismanaged change processes in patient safety initiatives. 
Conclusions: The challenge of patient safety is not only clinical, but also 
organizational. To succeed, patient safety initiatives must be designed and 
executed using change management principles such as congruent changes 
targeting multiple components, specific change management roles for different 
participants in the care-delivery process, implementation through dedicated 
support structures and multiple tactics, and institutionalization through enhanced 
workforce capabilities and opportunities for continuous learning. The costs of 
mismanaging change go beyond the failure of patient safety initiatives—they 
include hardened employee skepticism toward calls for increased patient safety. 
Introduction  
The challenge of patient safety is inextricably linked, almost 
indistinguishable, from the challenge of organizational change. Patient safety 
efforts have as their primary goal the avoidance, prevention, and mitigation of 
patient harm caused by deficiencies in the processes of patient care delivery.
1, 2 
Such deficiencies arise naturally in today’s health care system, where care 
delivery processes involve numerous interfaces and patient handoffs among 
multiple health care practitioners with varying levels of educational and 
occupational training. These complex processes, themselves vulnerable to errors, 
are overlaid on a health care culture that emphasizes individual accountability, 
reinforces professional silos, and discourages consistent collaboration. Inevitably, 
remedying the unsafe conditions fostered in this context will require widespread 
organizational change at the point of care. Patient safety initiatives can succeed 
only to the extent to which health care organizations recognize the need for and 
develop the means to implement the necessary organizational changes.  
The situation in health care is reminiscent of that faced by manufacturing 
industries in the 1980s when competitive pressures demanded significant 
improvements in product quality. Typically, firms responded first by focusing Advances in Patient Safety: Vol. 2 
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exclusively on improving the technological features of the manufacturing process. 
But as the hoped-for improvements in product quality continued to remain 
elusive, these firms were compelled to undertake radical changes in their 
organizational structures and processes.
3 Their experiences with the difficult 
transition from “managing by imposing control” to “managing by eliciting 
commitment” provide the empirical basis for a growing body of research on 
organizational change and development.
4–6  
This paper draws selectively from this literature, as well as the authors’ 
observations of 40 hospitals in southwestern Pennsylvania, to highlight change 
management issues critical for the sustained success of patient safety initiatives. 
We present an organizational model to frame the fundamental choices and 
principles involved in managing such change. We then provide preliminary 
observations about how health care organizations approach these choices and 
discuss some early signs of unintended costs of mismanaging change. We 
conclude with implications for health care organizations seeking to achieve 
durable, organization-wide improvements in patient safety.  
Our primary goals are to draw the attention of patient safety specialists to 
organizational issues surrounding patient safety and to increase awareness about 
the literature on organizational change. Although the discussion that follows is 
informed by previous research, it is not intended to serve as a comprehensive 
literature review. Readers are encouraged to refer to works cited in this paper for 
additional information on organizational change management.  
Patient safety through the looking  
glass of organizational change 
To discuss the organizational issues relevant to improving patient safety, we 
use a conceptual framework proposed by Nadler and Tushman
4 (see Figure 1). 
Essentially, an organization is a complex system that—given a set of limited 
resources, an external environment, and history—develops a strategy to convert 
inputs to outputs. The conversion process relies on four different components: 
work; people; formal structures and processes; and informal structures and 
processes. To the extent that these components are aligned (or “congruent”) 
internally and with the strategy, the organization can perform effectively and 
produce quality outcomes. The lack of congruence leads to failure in achieving 
the desired goals.  
For health care organizations, the inputs that shape the strategy include the 
external environment (e.g., regulatory oversight, malpractice environment, 
media), availability of resources (e.g., financial, skilled care providers), and 
history (e.g., experience with adverse patient outcomes). In response, the 
organization develops a strategy to achieve specific outcomes (e.g., increased 
revenues, lower costs, improved quality of care). Furthermore, these outcomes  Organizational Change in Patient Safety Initiatives 
457 
Figure 1. Organizational framework (Nadler and Tushman
4) 
 
may be specified at different levels (e.g., organization-wide, specific departments, 
or specific processes). The strategy is implemented through configurations of 
organizational components consisting of work (the clinical domain, comprising 
technology, procedures, practices, and guidelines), people (multiple occupational 
groups with appropriate values, attitudes, and skills), formal structures and 
processes (division of labor into departments, coordination mechanisms such as 
committees, and communication among different care providers), and informal 
structures and processes (culture, including shared assumptions and values, 
informal communication, etc.). 
Within this framework, organizational change occurs as a planned response to 
a defined set of pressures or forces.
6 The literature on organizational change and 
development identifies a set of basic choices that an organization confronts in 
managing this change: (1) How is the change defined? (2) Who participates in the 
change process and how? (3) How is change implemented? (4) How is change 
institutionalized (i.e., made self-sustaining)? We explore each of these choices in 
greater detail below. 
How is the change defined? 
An important early choice confronting an organization is whether in 
responding to increased environmental pressure for better performance—such as 
that arising from the Institute of Medicine’s report
1—it should initiate change in a 
few or many of its components. Depending on the degree to which the response 
reshapes and reconfigures the different components, change can take a variety of 
forms. A simple response may be “to do better than or do more of what already 
exists.” Typically, such “incremental change” or “tuning” can be implemented 
without altering any of the organizational components. A more complex response 
may require a radical redefinition of an organization’s mission, competencies, and 
culture. Invariably, such “transformational change” or “reorientation” calls for 
changes in multiple organizational components and their congruence. 
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Systemwide improvements in patient safety are possible only if there are 
coordinated changes in multiple components—clinical procedures, attitudes and 
behaviors of care providers, incentive systems, coordination structures and 
processes, patterns of interactions among care providers, and organizational 
culture. Change efforts that target only a few organizational components will not 
be adequate; neither will multiple changes that are unrelated.  
For example, in response to the need for significantly improved patient safety, 
a health care organization might develop a strategy to create a learning 
organization where participants in the delivery process engage in continuous 
learning. Implementing this strategy will require several changes: redesigning 
work processes to make errors more visible; providing incentives for practitioners 
to share information about errors; creating an informal context where practitioners 
feel psychologically safe about discussing their errors and seeking help from one 
another; and setting up information systems that facilitate information storage, 
retrieval, and analysis. In this sense, the challenge of patient safety is as much 
organizational as it is clinical. 
It must be noted that there may be no one strategy or one configuration of 
organizational components that constitutes an effective response. Differences in 
the idiosyncratic histories and experiences of organizations would suggest that 
different responses to the same set of pressures may be comparably effective.  
Who participates in the change process and how?  
Effective implementation of reorientation requires different organizational 
groups to play distinct roles in the change management process. To begin with, an 
organization’s senior leadership—medical as well as administrative—must play 
an active, visible role in initiating change, including articulating a vision of what 
the organization wants to become in the future. Second, senior management must 
energize the change process. This is particularly difficult when the change is 
anticipatory, since the rationale for change may not be self-evident or 
immediately compelling. Third, the chief executive officer (CEO) must establish a 
guiding coalition for change that includes senior administrators, clinicians, and 
opinion leaders from across the organization whose support is critical for the 
initiative’s success.
5 Fourth, the CEO, together with the guiding coalition, must 
create dissatisfaction with the status quo and impart a sense of “urgency” about 
the proposed change.
7, 8 Other people involved directly in the care delivery 
process must participate actively in implementing change locally.
9 
Fulfilling these roles can be particularly challenging in a hospital context, 
where the tendency to conduct “business as usual” is deeply entrenched. The 
inertia of the status quo is reinforced by several factors. First, senior physicians 
are often far removed from the routine processes of patient care delivery and may 
be unaware of the extent to which patients are exposed to errors. Second, many 
clinicians view only those errors that cause serious harm as a significant threat to 
patient safety; and since such events may happen infrequently, clinicians may not 
completely understand or generally accept the need for transformational change. 
Third, many medical staff members may view some of the proposed changes, Organizational Change in Patient Safety Initiatives 
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such as increasing interactions with nurses, as inappropriate or unnecessary for 
improving patient safety.  
To overcome these barriers, the CEO and the guiding coalition must create 
situations that shatter the assumptions underlying these viewpoints. For instance, 
information on near misses could be presented regularly to the medical staff, or 
medical staff could be required to directly observe patient care processes. Such 
firsthand encounters with process flaws are particularly useful for getting people 
to revise their assumptions. Another way to build momentum for change is for the 
CEO and members of the guiding coalition to participate visibly in the change 
process. Such action sends a powerful message across the organization that 
progress on the initiative is important and is being monitored on a daily basis. 
Their active, visible participation also helps to “model” desired changes in 
behaviors (e.g., senior medical staff discussing their own errors and admitting 
their fallibility).
10  
How is change implemented?  
Admittedly, implementing change is a complex undertaking. But at least two 
basic features associated with successful change are noteworthy: (a) 
implementing large-scale change calls for dedicated support structures; and (b) 
the likelihood of successful implementation of even a simple change increases 
significantly if multiple tactics, rather than a few tactics, are used.  
The first requirement is to create a set of supporting structures that will enable 
widespread change implementation. These may include a temporary 
organizational group that works full time on implementation; a pilot test site to try 
out some of the proposed changes; new communication channels for 
disseminating information about the proposed changes; and innovative training 
programs or employee visits to organizations that exemplify best practices 
suggested by the proposed change, among others.  
Implementing even a simple change in one of the organizational components 
requires multiple tactics. For example, promoting voluntary reporting may be one 
change in a system of changes comprising a patient safety initiative. Successful 
implementation of this change will require a coherent set of multiple tactics, such 
as active participation of members of the guiding coalition in the supporting 
structures set up to implement change; more frequent review of medication error 
reports by hospital administrators and senior medical staff (e.g., from monthly to 
weekly to daily); facilitating reporting through the use of an Intranet-based 
reporting system in lieu of other more tedious and time-consuming systems; 
encouraging conversations about medication errors among physicians, nurses, and 
pharmacists; or creating opportunities for health care workers across silos to 
resolve problems related to medication errors in a collaborative fashion. Although 
each tactic alone may be inadequate to produce the required change, with many 
“bullets” directed at the same target, the likelihood of successful implementation 
increases.
4  Advances in Patient Safety: Vol. 2 
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How is change institutionalized? 
Even if change is implemented successfully, there is always the risk that the 
organization may revert to earlier behaviors. This could happen because the 
organization may no longer be able to afford the resources that were allocated to 
initiating the change, the organization may face new pressures diverting senior 
leaders’ attention, or there may be turnover among key employees. The purpose 
of institutionalization is to develop organizational capabilities so that the change 
becomes a robust feature of the organizational context.
6  
Institutionalizing change requires a formal, long-term plan that coherently 
integrates multiple interrelated strategies. The first is the commitment of the CEO 
and senior staff to protect the initiative from competing priorities, so that even if 
financial pressures are intensified, resources allocated for implementation are not 
scaled back.
11  
Second, the organization must introduce structural changes that reinforce the 
change. For instance, improved interactions among health care workers might 
require new team structures that include physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and 
dieticians in joint review of cases on a daily basis. Such changes will ensure that 
the continuation of improved interactions is not left to chance or choice.  
Third, employees’ roles must be redesigned to match the new organizational 
realities.
12 To succeed in promoting patient safety, reorientation must result in a 
new congruence among organizational components that promotes continuous 
improvement at the point of care, such that improving care for patients becomes 
inseparable from identifying and solving problems in the process of delivering 
that care. Employees at the point of care must acquire the capabilities to analyze 
errors locally and implement appropriate solutions. Not only will this require 
additional employee training, but also a redefinition of job roles at the point of 
care. This is especially important because continued employee involvement 
depends critically on the extent to which staff view the change as helping them 
solve the problems they face in their daily work.
9  
Fourth, organizations must adapt to emerging and often unexpected demands, 
including new problems that may arise as the result of successful change 
implementation. For instance, success in increasing reporting may require a new 
organizational focus on how to solve the problems associated with the errors that 
are reported.  
Fifth, and perhaps most important, organizational leaders must continuously 
monitor the ongoing change process. Frequent employee surveys and 
administrative “walk-arounds” are some means by which senior leaders may keep 
track of the sustainability of change. 
To summarize, the effective management of change that is necessary for 
improved patient safety depends on how health care organizations address the set 
of interrelated choices about how change is defined, who participates in the 
change process and how—how change is implemented and how change is Organizational Change in Patient Safety Initiatives 
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institutionalized. In particular, it depends on whether these choices are consistent 
with the general change management principles discussed above. 
Observations about change management  
processes in patient safety initiatives 
Over the past 3 years, we have observed the efforts of 40 hospitals to 
implement different patient safety initiatives, including regionwide reporting, 
information sharing, and problem-solving focused on medication errors and 
nosocomial infections. To assess the effectiveness of these efforts, we visited 
many of these hospitals, interviewed key informants, conducted focus groups, 
participated in major committee meetings, and reviewed internal documents. 
These activities permit us to make some preliminary observations about how 
these organizations deal with change management processes.  
Overall, we observed serious mismatches between the organizational goal of 
improving patient safety and the change strategies hospitals have chosen to 
achieve this goal (Figure 2). These mismatches in turn have led to a number of 
unintended consequences that may affect the ability of organizations to achieve 
continuous improvements. What these organizations hope for are enduring, 
organization-wide improvements; but what they most often achieve are results 
that are local and temporary. The following comments represent situations that 
have been observed at more than one hospital and at more than one point over 
time.  
Mismatches between patient safety  
goals and change strategies 
Disconnect between how change is discussed and how it is actually 
defined. Many hospitals seem to recognize the need for multifaceted change for 
improving patient safety. Internal discussions in these hospitals consistently 
identify different requirements, including a better-integrated information 
technology, greater physician involvement, better communication between 
physicians and nurses, no-blame culture, etc. Yet when we examine what these 
hospitals actually do as they develop and implement specific patient safety 
initiatives, a major disconnect becomes evident. Only a few of these components 
are targeted by initiatives. Typically change efforts focus narrowly on a few 
organizational components, such as specific clinical practices or outcomes, and 
even these efforts are not consistent with one another. 
Participation limited to a few people playing traditional roles. Generally 
speaking, patient safety initiatives appear to be initiated and implemented by a 
small group of people with formal responsibilities for patient safety-related issues 
(e.g., pharmacy director, vice president, risk management) and informal patient 
safety champions. Often this group has insufficient authority to tackle issues that 
cut across departmental boundaries. Although senior leaders express support of 
these efforts, they are often far removed from the change management process  Advances in Patient Safety: Vol. 2 
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Figure 2. Unintended consequences of mismanaged organizational change 
 
and leave important choices about how change is defined and implemented to 
mid-level administrators. In many hospitals, there is little evidence that senior, 
influential representatives from the medical staff, nursing, pharmacy, and legal 
counsel work together as a guiding coalition. 
Absence of dedicated support structures for implementing change. Many 
hospitals continue to rely on existing structures and mechanisms to implement 
patient safety initiatives, even when the goals are expressed in terms of significant 
organization-wide changes. Few attempts, if any, are made to redefine the current 
responsibilities of individuals and groups engaged in patient safety initiatives or 
to provide additional resources to support the implementation effort. Often 
hospitals rely on committees that are already in place, such as the pharmacy and 
therapeutic committees, to review progress on implementing the initiative, 
thereby causing the pace of implementation to be constrained by meeting 
schedules. We attended a few meetings of these committees and noted that the 
error-reporting initiative represents only one isolated item in an already-crowded 
agenda of quality and safety issues that are not addressed in an integrated fashion. 
To encourage health care workers to report medication errors, hospitals 
implement a few narrowly focused tactics—such as disseminating memos and 
newsletters, posting signs and notices, giving presentations at meetings, and 
simplifying the reporting form—which are also typically disconnected from one 
another.  
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Inability to sustain change. In many hospitals, significant increases in error 
reporting were observed during the first 12 months of the initiative, with 
subsequent declines in the rates of increase thereafter. Key informants from these 
hospitals have pointed to different reasons for the slowdown. A common theme, 
however, is that the initiative continues to depend significantly on a few 
individuals for sustaining its momentum, and therefore is continually vulnerable 
to additional work demands placed upon these individuals, such as preparing for 
licensure and accreditation reviews (e.g., by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Health or the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations).  
Unintended consequences of mismatched change 
One obvious result of such mismatches is a failure to achieve patient safety 
goals, a worrisome enough outcome. What is additionally troubling, however, is 
the potential for other, less obvious consequences that we observed. 
Hardened employee skepticism about the organizational call for change. 
When change is defined in transformational terms, the expectations of employees 
are raised, and many want to participate enthusiastically in the proposed change. 
But when the implementation is characterized by inconsistencies, the process can 
lead to increased skepticism, not just toward the initiative at hand, but future 
initiatives as well. In some cases, we observed that hospital leaders espouse a 
blame-free culture, even as nurses who report errors continue to be “written up.” 
Indeed, in many hospitals, the forms used for reporting errors continue to list 
“human performance deficit” as one likely cause, and “human performance 
deficit” remains among the most commonly identified causes of medication 
errors. Some nurses said they responded to the new initiative by reporting more 
errors, only to find that the same errors continued to occur, so they stopped 
reporting.  
Inevitable frustration of patient safety champions. Across hospitals we 
identified a number of patient safety champions who have played an important 
catalytic role in initiating and implementing the error-reporting initiative. These 
physicians, nurses, and pharmacists participated actively in the new initiative 
from its inception. Our early observations and interviews indicated that they had 
high expectations and enthusiasm for the initiative. Two years into the effort, 
however, some of them expressed frustration with the scope of change, pace of 
progress, and lack of support from senior leaders. We observed several cases 
where patient safety champions were overwhelmed by poorly conceived and 
executed initiatives. In some cases they got “burned out” or dropped out of the 
program completely.  
“Mis-learning” by organizational members. Mismanaged change can 
actually make patient safety worse. Take, for example, the previously described 
situation where nurses stopped reporting when the medication errors they 
uncovered were not corrected. In one hospital, these nurses went so far as to set 
up a “work-around” (e.g., a hotline to the pharmacy for reporting missing 
medication); they now call the pharmacy to obtain missing medication, rather than 
report these incidents as errors. This type of mis-learning, where workers Advances in Patient Safety: Vol. 2 
464 
conclude that errors are a normal—even acceptable—part of delivering care, is 
perhaps one of the greatest dangers of patient safety initiatives that suffer from 
failed execution.
13 
Conclusions 
In the years ahead, improving patient safety must continue to be a priority for 
health care organizations. As the preceding examples illustrate, better change 
management capabilities are not just desirable, they are necessary for achieving 
and sustaining patient safety improvements. If health care organizations are to 
transform their processes for delivering care to promote patient safety, the logic of 
organizational change must start to drive patient safety initiatives. Fortunately, 
well-documented cases of successful transformations across organizations in other 
industries provide a useful template for health care organizations preparing to 
initiate similar changes. Specific implications for health care organizations are as 
follows: 
•  Change must consistently target multiple organizational components. 
Organizational leaders must engage in solid diagnostic thinking before 
finalizing the response to change. In particular, they must avoid the 
reflexive response of viewing the problem as exclusively clinical or 
technological and simply trying harder, and become open to the need for 
more fundamental organizational change. 
•  Participants in the delivery process must play distinct roles in 
managing change. Senior leadership must play an active role in 
establishing patient safety as an important and urgent priority; building a 
coalition of powerful constituents, including senior administrators and 
medical staff; modeling the desired behaviors; devoting more time and 
resources to organizational development relevant to patient safety; and 
anticipating and resolving the inevitable problems that will arise. People 
involved directly in providing care must participate actively in 
implementing change. 
•  Change must be implemented using support structures and multiple 
tactics integrated in a long-term plan. Support structures dedicated to 
patient safety must guide a carefully designed system of tactics that are 
consistent with one another and aligned with the purpose of change. 
•  Change must be institutionalized by providing health care workers 
with the capabilities and opportunities to engage in continuous safety 
improvement. This will require redesigning the roles of health care 
workers at the point of care and retraining them to fulfill these roles.  
Admittedly, the above is a formidable list of requirements. But few 
organizations have transformed themselves without following these principles. 
Ultimately, the critical difference between a health care organization that 
succeeds in dramatically improving patient safety and one that does not will come 
down to effective change management capabilities. Organizational Change in Patient Safety Initiatives 
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